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Abstract
We show that the negative impact of financial crises on trade is magnified for
destinations with longer time-to-ship. A simple model where exporters react to an
increase in the probability of default of importers by increasing their export price
and decreasing their export volumes to destinations in crisis is consistent with this
empirical finding. For longer shipping time, those effects are indeed magnified as
the probability of default increases as time passes. Some exporters also decide to stop
exporting to the crisis destination, the more so the longer time-to-ship. Using aggregate
data from 1950 to 2009, we find that this magnification effect is robust to alternative
specifications, samples and inclusion of additional controls, including distance. The
firm level predictions are also broadly consistent with French exporter data from 1995
to 2005.
Keywords: Time-to-ship, Financial crises, international trade
JEL classification codes: F10, G01, G32
∗We thank the International Growth Centre (LSE and Oxford University) for financial help. We thank
Francesco Giavazzi, Nicolas Schmitt, Helene Rey and Cedric Tille as well as participants at the 2012 NBER
ISOM conference in Oslo, CREI, UAB, ITAM and at Colegio de Mexico for helpful comments. We are
grateful to Jules Hugot and Jules-Daniel Wurlod for excellent research assistance. We are most thankful to
James Feyrer who generously shared with us his dataset on time-to-ship. Philippe Martin thanks CREI at
Pompeu Fabra for its hospitality.
†Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, and CEPR. Email: nico-
las.berman@graduateinstitute.ch
‡University of Paris Sud and CES, University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne. Email: jose.de-sousa@univ-
paris1.fr
§Sciences-Po and CEPR. Email: philippe.martin@sciences-po.fr
¶Sciences-Po, CEPII and CEPR. Email: thierry.mayer@sciences-po.fr.
1 Introduction
This paper documents a robust stylized fact: the fall in trade caused by financial crises is
magnified by the time-to-ship goods between the origin and the destination country. The
paper is motivated by the collapse of world trade that occurred during the financial crisis
of 2008-2009 and the debates on why it was much larger than the fall in world GDP and
demand. But we go further by analyzing the effect of financial crises on trade using historical
data. The amplification effect of time-to-ship is very robust. It is observed at the bilateral
level on a large panel of countries over the period 1950-2009 and at the firm-level over the
period 1995-2005. We argue that this stylized fact of financial crises strongly suggests that
they affect trade not only because they impact demand but also through financial frictions
which are specific to international trade.
International trade differs from intranational trade in several dimensions. One on which
we focus in this paper and which we can interpret as a financial friction is time-to-ship1. It
takes time to transport goods internationally and we focus on how this financial friction is
exacerbated during a financial crisis. For instance, a shipment takes more than 28 days to go
from Rotterdam to Hong-Kong but a bit more than 1 day from Rotterdam to Copenhagen.
This is without taking into account the time to load and unload the boat and the time taken
by customs and other administrative procedures. Djankov, Freund, and Pham (2006) found
in a sample of 180 countries that the median amount of time it takes from the moment the
goods are ready to ship from the factory until the goods are loaded on a ship is 21 days.
In “normal” circumstances, time to load, ship... implies a transport cost which depends
on distance, the value and the weight of the good transported. Of course even in normal
times, there is an opportunity cost to time which can be measured broadly by the cost of
capital. However, during a financial crisis time-to-ship takes a new dimension: as time passes
during which goods are stuck on cargo the probability that a financial incident takes place
in the destination country rises. We model this incident as the possibility that during a
financial crisis the importer defaults on her payment obligation. We present a simple partial
equilibrium model in which heterogeneous exporters sell to distant importers. We show that
1We are not the first to analyze the implications of this characteristic of international trade (see for
example Amiti and Weinstein (2011) and Feyrer (2011) for the most recent contributions).
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in such a framework the negative impact on trade of the increased probability of default that
comes with a financial crisis is amplified by the time it takes to ship the good. Crucially,
time to ship does not in this case simply represent an extra cost, like transport costs do, it
increases the elasticity of export volume to the expected cost of default. This is the core of
the magnification effect that time to ship produces. The reason is that exporters react to
this increased probability of default by raising their export price and reducing their export
volumes and values, the more so the longer the time of shipping. This can be thought as a
pricing to market strategy that depends on financial conditions in the destination country.
Hence, on the intensive margin, the value of imports by existing importers falls with a
financial crisis and this is more so the longer the time to trade with the exporter country.
We also show that in such a framework, the probability to exit and cease exporting is higher
in a country that experiences a financial crisis and that this effect is again amplified by
time-to-ship.
We test these firm-level predictions on firm-destination specific export data obtained
from the French customs over the period 1995-2005. The firm-level data, in addition to the
aggregate data, is consistent with predictions of the model and the role of time-to-ship. We
find that French exporters indeed raise their price and decrease their export volumes when
the destination country is hit by a crisis. The reduction in volume and value is larger when
time-to-ship is longer. Similarly, the probability that an exporter exits a given destination
increases when the destination incurs a financial crisis, the more so when time-to-ship is
longer. Using aggregate data from 1950 to 2009, we find that this magnification effect is
robust to alternative specifications, samples and inclusion of additional controls, including
distance. Both in firm level and aggregate regressions, when we include both the time-to-ship
variable and distance, only the effect of time-to-ship remains significant. This suggests that
the mechanism that we uncover is indeed due to the role of time as a financial friction.
There is a now large and still growing literature on the analysis of the trade collapse during
the recent financial crisis. Some papers have analyzed the characteristics of countries and
sectors that were most hit by the financial crisis. This is the case of Chor and Manova (2012)
who analyze the effect that credit conditions had on international trade during the recent
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global crisis by examining the evolution of monthly US imports over the November 2006 to
October 2009 period, and compare trade patterns before and during the crisis. They identify
the impact of credit conditions by exploiting the variation in the cost of external capital across
countries and over time, as well as the variation in financial vulnerability across sectors.
They find that during the crisis period, countries with tighter credit availability exported
less to the US, relative to other countries. Another related paper on the effect of credit
constraints on export performance at the firm level is Amiti and Weinstein (2011) who show
that Japanese banks transmitted financial shocks to exporters during the systemic crisis in
Japan in the 1990s. Ahn, Amiti, and Weinstein (2011) review evidence that financial factors
may have resulted in a greater decline in exports than were predicted in models without
financial frictions. They show that export prices rose relative to domestic manufacturing
prices across a large number of countries. This is consistent with a result we find in a very
different data set which is that export prices rise when the destination country experiences a
financial crisis. They also find that import and export prices of goods shipped by sea, which
are likely to be affected most by trade finance contractions, rose disproportionately more
than those shipped by air or land. Our paper is complementary to theirs in pushing the
argument that what we document in this paper resemble footprints left by financial friction
shocks during a financial crisis. In the same vein, Bricongne et al. (2012) find that the
exports of French firms in more external finance-dependent sectors were more adversely hit
during the recent global crisis. However, some economists have downplayed the role of trade
frictions and trade finance when explaining the drop in international trade. Levchenko et
al. (2010) emphasize the disruption of global production lines and the reduction in trade in
intermediate goods during the recent financial crisis to explain that the fall in trade has been
larger than the fall of output and therefore conclude that trade finance has played a minor role
in the trade collapse of 2008-2009.2 Eaton et al. (2011) quantify the relative contributions
of changes in demand versus changes in trade frictions, using a general equilibrium model of
production and trade. They also conclude that the fall in demand was more important.
2Interestingly, in another paper, Levchenko et al. (2011) find results that are very much related to ours
on the role of shipping time on US trade data during the 2008-2009 financial crisis. They find that the fall
of US imports (but not exports) during the financial crisis period (Q2-2008 to Q2-2009) was larger with
countries with longer time-to-ship. They also find that sectors with higher shares of imports shipped by
ocean (relative to air shipping) experienced larger drops.
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Finally, we are not the first to focus on time-to-ship to better understand trade patterns
during financial crises. In addition to Levchenko et al. (2010) already cited, Alessandria et
al. (2010), Ahn (2011), Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011), Leibovici and Waugh (2010), Kim and
Shin (2012) present models with time-to-ship frictions. The first shows that this introduc-
tion generates inventory adjustments that can explain the trade collapse during the latest
financial crisis. The mechanism we focus on which generates testable implications at both
the aggregate and firm levels is however different as it does not rely on inventories. Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2011) and Antras and Foley (2011) present rich models with time-to-ship that
endogenizes the choice of trade financing in a situation where default risks exist both for
exporters and importers.
The paper is organized as follows. We present, in the next section, a simple model of
international trade with possible importer default, and we derive implications of the role of
time-to-ship during financial crises, at the firm and at the aggregate level. In section 3, using
aggregate data on bilateral trade on the period 1950-2009, we show that that the negative
impact of a financial crisis on trade is magnified by time-to-ship between the two countries.
Finally, in section 4, using French exporter-level data we test the firm-level implications of
the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We present a simple model where a financial crisis generates a fall in imports which is more
pronounced for country pairs with a longer shipping time. The aim of the model is to
provide guidance for our empirical work and generate simple testable implications at the
aggregate and at the firm levels. The model is in partial equilibrium and the financial crisis
is considered as an exogenous event. We leave for future research the aim of analyzing these
issues in a general equilibrium framework. We focus on exporters in the Home country who
export to many countries, each of them characterized by the number of periods s it takes to
ship a good to the Home country.3 Exporters differ in terms of productivity ϕ as in Melitz
3For a general equilibrium model of time-to-ship that analyzes how the variation in the rate at which
agents are willing to substitute across time affects how trade volumes respond to changes in income and
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(2003).
The model features a financial friction in the form of an exogenous probability of default
per period which depends on the state of the economy. Each period, the probability that an
importer of country s encounters a financial difficulty and defaults on his payments is qs. If
the importer defaults, we assume for simplicity that the exporter is not paid for the goods
she has shipped and loses the value of the shipment4. The probability that the payment due
is effectively paid is therefore (1− qs)s. The probability that a default occurs during the
shipping period increases with the length of shipping.
The probability qs, which characterizes the financial health of country s, is assumed
to be higher during a financial crisis.5 Exporters are risk neutral firms in monopolistic
competition markets and face a price elasticity of demand of σ in the markets they export
to. They only use labor in production and have heterogeneous labor productivity ϕ. We
can think of importers as wholesalers who then sell to consumers with Dixit-Stiglitz type of
utility with love for variety. In this case, σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties
in the utility function of consumers. The exporter is paid when the goods are delivered.
Hence, we do not take into account the possibility that the (risk neutral) exporter can
buy insurance through trade finance and bank intermediation and we assume she uses open
account terms. Importers can—but will not always choose to6—use letters of credit issued by
their banks (the issuing bank) as a means of assuring exporters that they will be paid. If the
exporter submits the required documentation (invoices, bills of lading, etc.) to its bank (the
advising or confirming bank), payment is made to the exporter. Letters of credit are however
expensive and require both confidence and liquidity to provide finance and insurance about
prices, see Leibovici and Waugh (2011).
4In reality, the penalty may not be as harsh except of course in the case of perishable goods. If the goods
can be shipped back from destination the cost of the financial incident will be lower but our main conclusions
will remain qualitatively similar.
5Some heterogeneity on the dimension of the importers, in particular on their financial health, could be
added but this would not change the results fundamentally.
6Antras and Foley (2011) use a detailed transaction level data from a U.S. based exporter of frozen
and refrigerated food products, primarily poultry, to describe broad patterns about the use of alternative
financing terms. The most commonly used financing terms do not involve direct financial intermediation
by banks. They are cash in advance terms and open account terms; these are used for 44.0% and 39.2%
of the value of transactions, respectively. Cash in advance terms require the importer to pay before goods
are shipped. Open account terms allow a customer to pay a certain amount of time following receipt of the
goods
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payment to the exporter. The confirming bank may lack confidence in the issuing bank.
Ronci (2004) indeed reports sharp falls of trade finance during the most important emerging
markets financial crises of the 1990s. During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, the collapse
of trade finance was also blamed for part of the trade collapse. Auboin (2009) reports an
increase in 2008 in spreads on 90 days letters of credit from 10-16 basis points in normal
times to 250-500 basis points for letters issued by certain “risky” countries. A study by the
IMF (2009) that surveyed several banks in developed and emerging markets reported a sharp
increase in the cost of trade finance: 70% of the banks reported that the price for letters of
credit had risen. In our model, if the cost of trade finance was to increase with the probability
of default and a financial crisis, our qualitative results would be similar: higher cost of trade
finance during financial crises would rise exponentially with the time-to-ship the goods and
would translate in higher marginal costs and prices in the same manner as in the present
model. A much richer model that endogeneizes the financing mode of international trade
as a function of default of both importers and exporters is provided by Schmidt-Eisenlohr
(2011) and Antras and Foley (2011) but this extension is beyond the scope of this paper.
The exporter’s problem is therefore to maximize the present value of profits of exporting to
country s:
Vs (ϕ) =
ps(ϕ)τsxs(ϕ)
(1 + r)s
(1− qs)s − w
ϕ
τsxs(ϕ)− F, (1)
where the first term is the value of sales discounted by the per period interest rate r and
the probability of default of the importer. w is the wage rate and w/ϕ the marginal cost of
production. F is a fixed cost to export. These costs have to be paid before the export takes
place. Profit maximization generates the following optimal price and export quantities:
ps (ϕ) =
σ
σ − 1
w
ϕ
(
1 + r
1− qs
)s
, (2)
xs (ϕ) = YsP
σ−1
s [τsps (ϕ)]
−σ = YsP σ−1s
[
σ
σ − 1
wτs
ϕ
(
1 + r
1− qs
)s]−σ
, (3)
where Ys and Ps are respectively the income of the country and the standard welfare-based
price index that depends on prices of all locally produced and imported varieties. The first
two elements of the price equation (2) are the standard markup and marginal cost of the
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firm. The third element is specific to our setup and depends on time-to-ship. Because the
probability of default increases with shipping time, the exporter will react by increasing its
price and decreasing its export quantity for importers at longer shipping times. This is also
the case because the opportunity cost of funds increases with shipping times and the interest
rate. The later represents the cost of borrowing, which can rise abruptly for firms during a
financial crisis. This specific prediction of the model (exporters charge higher export prices to
destinations with higher shipping time) can be related to other models and empirical results
(see Manova and Zhang, 2012 or Martin, 2010) who have found a similar result but with a
different mechanism (additive transport costs for example). Note that if importers differed by
their financial situation so that each importer had a different probability of default in a given
country, the exporter would discriminate against less “trusted” importers (importers with
lower capital, assets with lower value, a more vulnerable balance sheet...) by a higher price
and a lower exported quantity. This is what Antras and Foley (2011) find in a recent study
on poultry exports. Note also, that the reduction of trade, which comes from the decision
of exporters to raise their price, comes on top of the standard demand effect (income Ys in
the crisis country falls) and the possible effect on the price index Ps which could come for
example with a sharp real depreciation.
A notable implication of our framework is that during financial crises, firm-level export
prices should increase whereas firm-level export volumes and values should fall: exporters
discriminate against destinations hit by a financial crisis because the expected marginal
revenue falls in such destinations. This can be thought as a pricing-to-market strategy that
depends on financial conditions in the destination country. Both effects on prices and volumes
should be magnified by longer shipping time s.7 Crucially, time is by nature different from
transaction costs such as transport costs (iceberg costs τs in our framework) or asymmetric
information. Time to ship does not simply reduce the expected revenues of trading overseas,
it increases the elasticity of this expected loss to financial risk.
∂ps (ϕ)
∂qs
qs
ps (ϕ)
=
sqs
1− qs , (4)
7For simplicity, we investigate the effect a marginal increase in qs, which may increase more sharply
during a financial crisis.
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∂xs (ϕ)
∂qs
qs
xs (ϕ)
= − sσqs
1− qs ;
∂ps (ϕ)xs (ϕ)
∂qs
qs
ps (ϕ)xs (ϕ)
= −s(σ − 1)qs
1− qs . (5)
Note that in these equations, the transport cost τs, does not appear and therefore plays no
role in the magnification effect. Time to ship is, in interaction with financial risk, of different
nature because it raises the elasticity of export volumes to change in financial risk. This will
be important in the empirical section where we will want to distinguish between transport
costs and time to ship. Note also that in the above equations, we do not take into account
the impact that the financial crisis may have on export volumes through its effect on the
price index and the income of the importing country. We will however be taking this effect
into account when we go to the data. There is a threshold level of productivity ϕ below
which the exporter will decide not to export, i.e., when Vs the present value of exporting to
country s turns negative. We call this threshold for country s, ϕ∗s. It can be shown that the
effect of an increase in the probability of default on this threshold is given by:
∂ϕ∗s
∂qs
qs
ϕ∗s
=
sσ
σ − 1
qs
1− qs > 0 (6)
Hence, by raising the probability of default, a financial crisis pushes some lower productivity
firms to exit. Again, this extensive margin effect is amplified by shipping time.
We are interested in analyzing the impact of a financial crisis that raises the overall
probability of default of firms in the importer country, qs. It can potentially also increase
the interest rate r if the financial crisis (as in the case of 2008-2009) is a global crisis that raises
the risk premium. Note that in our framework, the effect of an increase in the probability
of default and of the interest rate have essentially the same qualitative impact.
The model also generates implications at the aggregate level. The value of the expected
aggregate exports of the Home country to country s are given by:
Xs =
∫ ∞
ϕ∗s
(1− qs)s ps(ϕ)xs(ϕ)dG(ϕ) = CsYsP σ−1s
∫ ∞
ϕ∗s
ϕσ−1
(
1− qs
1 + r
)sσ
dG(ϕ) (7)
where Cs is a constant. Given the impact of a rise in q, which we interpret as a financial
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crisis, the impact on exports to country s contains three terms:
∂Xs
∂qs
qs
Xs
= es +
∂Ys
∂qs
qs
Ys
+ (σ − 1)∂Ps
∂qs
qs
Ps
, (8)
where the last two terms reflect the impact the crisis has on the income and the price index
of the importer country. We assume that the net effect of these two last terms is negative.
The first term es represents the impact of the financial crisis on aggregate trade once the
income and the price effects have been controlled for.
Assuming a Pareto distribution for ϕ with k being the Pareto distribution parameter (an
inverse measure of productivity heterogeneity) we obtain that:
es = −sσ qs
1− qs −
sσ(k + 1− σ)
σ − 1
qs
1− qs = −
sσk
σ − 1
qs
1− qs . (9)
The first term in the first equation is the impact of an increase in the probability of default on
the intensive margin of exports and the second one is the impact on the extensive margin of
exports. Hence, the theory predicts that, as for the firm-level results, an increased probability
of default negatively affects aggregate exports and that this negative impact is amplified by
shipping time, through both the intensive and extensive margins.
Several predictions of our model can therefore been tested. At the aggregate level, the
negative impact of a financial crisis on the imports of the country is amplified by time-to-ship
from the source country. Note also that a financial crisis in the exporter country if it raises
the cost of funding for the exporter has the same qualitative effect on trade as a financial
crisis in the importer country: an increase in r has the same impact as an increase in q. In
particular, the impact of such funding stress on trade should be amplified by time-to-ship.
There are also several predictions of our framework that can be tested using firm-level
data. First, exporters raise their export price in countries hit by a financial crisis and this
is more so the higher time-to-ship to the country affected by the financial crisis (equation
4). Both the volume and the value of the exports at the firm level should decrease when
the destination country is hit by a financial crisis and this effect should be amplified by
shipping time to destination (equation 5). Finally, when a country is hit by a financial
crisis, the probability that some exporters cease to export to that country increases. Again,
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shipping time should amplify this increase in exit probability (equation 6). We now take
these predictions to the data, starting with the aggregate implications.
3 Time-to-ship and the effect of crises on trade: country-
level evidence
3.1 Empirical methodology
We first want to assess the effect of a banking crisis in a country on bilateral imports of this
country, and how this effect varies with the time it takes to ship goods from each partner
country. In this section we do this using aggregate trade data. A key issue is how to measure
the time spent to trade goods internationally. A first possibility is to proxy this by geodesic
bilateral distance. A second possibility is to use estimates of the time needed to ship goods.
This is closer certainly to the mechanism we want to highlight. It is however not perfect
as country pairs do not transport all goods by sea. Some goods are transported by road
and others by air. We will try to deal with this issue. But, not surprisingly distance and
time-to-ship are closely related and we will analyze how the results differ when we use either
or both in the regressions. Our baseline estimation takes the form of a standard gravity
equation:
lnXijt = α1 lnYit + α2 lnYjt + δTijt + γ1BCjt + γ2(BCjt × ln d˜ij) + µij + ηt + εijt, (10)
where Xijt represents exports from country i to country j at year t, Y is GDP, and Tijt
contains a set of time-varying bilateral controls, including FTA, currency union, and the
real exchange rate. In most of the regressions, we include bilateral fixed effects µij, so that
time-invariant bilateral characteristics such as time-to-ship or geodesic distance, common
language, contiguity or colonial links are captured (although this specification allows for
interactions with the crises variable). BCjt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
if the destination country j experienced a banking crisis during year t, and ln d˜ij is the log
of bilateral time-to-ship between countries i and j (demeaned such that ln d˜ij = 0 for the
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average value taken by time-to-ship in the sample). Finally, ηt represent year dummies and
εijt the error term.
Our coefficients of interest are γ1 and γ2. The first is expected to be negative: a banking
crisis decreases imports (even after controlling for demand). We will see that γ2 is also
estimated to be negative: the negative effect of banking crises in the destination country is
magnified by bilateral time-to-ship.
A difficulty when estimating this specification is that it omits the ideal price indexes
(or multilateral resistance–MR–indexes, using Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003 celebrated
terminology). The inclusion of bilateral fixed effects µij only partly solves the problem, as
these MR indexes may vary over time, especially during financial crises. We will therefore
check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of importer and exporter × year dummies.
The inclusion of importer × year dummies controls for the importer price index that varies
over time. It prevents from estimating γ1, but our main coefficient of interest, γ2, can still
be identified.
Finally, in all estimations standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered
at the destination × year level.8
3.2 Data
The trade data come from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics
(DoTS).9 It covers the 1950-2009 period, which is of crucial importance, since this includes
the recent financial crisis, as well as past crisis episodes. While DoTS lacks data on trade for
individual goods, it is the only data set containing a panel of worldwide bilateral trade that
goes back far enough to offer a good match with the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)’s data set on
financial crises dates from 1800 to 2010. Our final data set includes 185 exporting countries
and 69 importing countries from 1950 to 2009. Table 6 in Appendix A.1 lists the countries in
our sample and indicates the countries covered in the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)’s dataset.
The lower number of importing countries is due to the availability of the financial crises data.
8Note that our results are robust to clustering at the country-pair level.
9See Head, Mayer and Ries (2010: Appendix A) for details on the compilation of trade flows from DoTS,
and other gravity variables. We mostly rely on the same procedures here, with updated data.
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Controlling for the occurrence of crises in the exporting country results in a significant loss of
information, but leaves our results unchanged, as we will show later. For financial crises, we
follow the literature and focus on banking crises (and check the robustness of our results with
currency crises). According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2011: 1680), a banking crisis is marked
by two types of events: “(1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover by the
public sector of one or more financial institutions; and (2) if there are no runs, the closure,
merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial institution
(or group of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other
financial institutions.” Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)’s data set combines various sources. Our
final data set contains around a hundred of events, which include both, in their classification,
severe and systemic banking crises. Appendix A.1 depicts other important characteristics of
our data set: the frequency of country pairs with a banking crises in the destination country
is plotted in Figure 1, the starting dates of the crises is shown in Table 7, and the mean
differences in covariates with and without banking crises are reported in Table 9.
GDPs come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Since WDI
starts in 1960 and does not contain information for some countries (e.g., Taiwan or Russia
before 1989), we complement WDI with estimates provided by Angus Maddison.10 The
data on Free Trade agreements (FTA) are mainly constructed from three main sources:
(1) Table 3 in Baier and Bergstrand (2007); (2) the WTO web site11 and (3) qualitative
information contained in Frankel (1997). The data on currency unions (CU) are an updated
and extended version of the list provided by Glick and Rose (2002).12 Bilateral real exchange
rate is computed based on Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011). Bilateral distance
is calculated as the population-weighted great circle (geodesic) distance between the largest
cities of the two countries and come from the CEPII distance database, as well as common
(official) language, contiguity, common colonizer and colonial relationships.13.
We use the data of Feyrer (2011) on time-to-ship to get a measure of the time it takes
to trade between countries. The time required to travel from any oceanic point to each
10http://www.ggdc.net/maddison
11http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm
12Programs for constructing data on FTA and CU are available at http://jdesousa.univ.free.fr/
data.htm.
13http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
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of its trading partners is calculated by Feyrer (2011) using very detailed geographic data
to reconstruct shortest shipping routes, and assuming a speed of 20 knots. Feyrer’s data
set covers 130 out of our 185 exporting countries and 59 out of our 69 importing countries.
Thus, to avoid losing information on financial crises, we expand and amend his data set. Not
surprisingly, the correlation between Feyrer’s time-to-ship estimate and geodesic bilateral
distance is high (.88). Not surprisingly either, the largest deviations are for contiguous
countries. For those pairs of countries, we replace the time to ship value by the “time-to-
road” based on the geodesic distance and assumed a speed of 60 knots.14 Feyrer’s sample
also excludes landlocked countries and other countries such as Belgium. To recover bilateral
information for those countries, we identified their closest primary port.15 Then, for each
landlocked country, we computed a time-to-road to that port and added the time-to-ship
for each given destination. In robustness checks, we also run regressions using the simple
geodesic distance as a proxy for the time it takes to trade between two countries, as well as
the original Feyrer’s time-to-ship.
Finally, we will also check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of financial
development, proxied by the ratio of private credit over GDP from the WDI between 1960
and 2009.
3.3 Results
Baseline results. We want to study whether the fall in trade caused by a financial crisis in
the destination country is magnified by time-to-ship between the origin and the destination
country. Table 1 presents our baseline results, based on the estimation of different specifi-
cations of equation (10). In columns (1) and (2), we replace the country-pair fixed effects
(µij) with directional exporter and importer fixed effects. In columns (3) to (9), we include
bilateral fixed effects (µij). Additionally, in column (6), we control for importer × year, and
in column (7) for both importer × year and exporter × year fixed effects.16
14This speed represents a reasonable average between a slower truck speed and a faster train speed.
15The data comes from http://www.e-ships.net/ports.php.
16For regressions (6) and (7), we make use of Guimaraes and Portugal (2010)’s algorithm to estimate
models with high-dimensional fixed effects.
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Table 1: Crises, time-to-ship and imports: Baseline results
Dependent Variable ln Bilateral exports
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
ln GDP originit 0.91
a 0.91a 0.89a 0.89a 0.89a 1.00a 0.88a 0.88a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP destinationjt 0.82
a 0.83a 0.80a 0.80a 0.80a 0.80a 0.80a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FTAij 0.52
a 0.52a 0.44a 0.44a 0.46a 0.57a 0.55a 0.45a 0.44a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Common currencyijt 0.13
a 0.13a 0.29a 0.28a 0.31a 0.43a 0.20a 0.31a 0.30a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln Real exchange rateijt 0.003 0.003 0.02
a 0.02a 0.02a 0.35a 0.08a 0.02a 0.02a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln time-to-shipij -0.93
a -0.92a
(0.01) (0.01)
Banking crisis in destinationjt -0.03
c -0.06a -0.06a -0.07a -0.08a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Banking crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij -0.11a -0.07a -0.08a -0.07a -0.08a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Banking crisisjt × FTAijt -0.14a
(0.03)
Banking crisisjt × common legalij 0.02
(0.02)
Banking crisisjt × common currencyijt -0.19a
(0.05)
Banking crisisjt × languageij 0.01
(0.04)
Banking crisisjt × contiguityij 0.04
(0.05)
Post-2007 Banking crisisjt -0.36
a -0.38a
(0.07) (0.08)
Pre-2007 Banking crisisjt -0.02 -0.04
c
(0.02) (0.02)
Post-2007 Banking crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij -0.06b
(0.03)
Pre-2007 Banking crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij -0.08a
(0.01)
Observations 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462
R2 0.734 0.734 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.868 0.563 0.856 0.856
Observations 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462 307462
Country-pair fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter and importer fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No No No No
Importer × year fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes No No
Exporter × year fixed effects No No No No No No Yes No No
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by destination-year, with a, b, and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels. Year dummies are included in all estimations. Time-to-ship is demeaned. In columns (1) and (2), estimates of time-invariant bilateral
variables (contiguity, common language, common colonizer, colony, common legal origin) are not reported but available upon request.
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The coefficients on the standard gravity determinants are significant and of the expected
signs. When including country-pair fixed effect, a banking crisis in the destination country is
found to decrease significantly bilateral exports, although the size of the effect is moderate:
between -5.8% (exp(−0.06)− 1) and -7.7% (exp(−0.08)− 1) in columns (3) to (5). Time-to-
ship however magnifies the response of trade to banking crises: the interaction term between
the banking crisis dummy and bilateral time-to-ship is negative and significant at the 1%
level (in columns 2 and 4 to 7). To give an order of magnitude, a one standard deviation
increase of time-to-ship from the mean magnifies the effect of a banking crisis on imports
from -7 to -10% in column (4).
To ensure that our results are not due to the correlation of time-to-ship with other
bilateral characteristics that affect the response of trade to crises, we include in column
(5) a number of additional interaction terms between bilateral variables (FTA, common
currency, common language, common legal origin, and contiguity) and distance. Some of
these interactions are indeed significant: for instance, a crisis in a destination country has
a larger negative impact on bilateral trade if the two countries belong to the same trade
agreement or currency union. These two effects are interesting and somewhat surprising.
They suggest that our results on time-to-ship do not reflect the impact of financial crises on
more fragile trade relations between countries that are both distant and without monetary
or trade agreements. The interaction term on time-to-ship is unaffected by these controls.
The amplification effect of time-to-ship is remarkably stable when we include importer
× year (column 6) or both importer × year and exporter × year dummies (column 7). In
columns (8) and (9) of Table 1, we check whether the recent financial crisis has a different
effect on trade compared with past crisis episodes. We thus split the banking crisis dummy
into two variables: a dummy for the recent crisis, after 2007, and a dummy for previous crises.
The recent crisis is found to have reduced trade more strongly (for a given fall in GDP and
other controls): -30% (exp(−0.36) − 1) for the recent crisis versus -2% (and statistically
insignificant) for past crisis (column 8). The magnification effect of time-to-ship is however
similar for crises before and after 2007 (column 9).
Robustness. In Table 2 we replicate the main estimations of Table 1 including dummies for
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banking crises in the exporter countries as well as an interaction term between these dummies
and time-to-ship. Again we include either exporter and importer dummies (columns 1 and
2), country-pair fixed-effects (columns 3 and 4), country-pair and importer×year (column 5)
or country-pair, importer×year and exporter×year fixed effects (column 6).
Table 2: Crises, time-to-ship and exports
Dependent Variable ln Bilateral exports
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln GDP originit 0.95
a 0.95a 0.87a 0.88a 1.09a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP destinationjt 0.87
a 0.87a 0.83a 0.84a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FTAijt 0.40
a 0.39a 0.36a 0.35a 0.51a 0.54a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Common currencyijt 0.10
b 0.09b 0.14a 0.13a 0.37a 0.26a
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln Real exchange rateijt 0.003 0.003 0.01
a 0.01a 0.52a 0.14a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
ln time-to-shipij -0.88
a -0.85a
(0.01) (0.01)
Banking crisis in destinationjt -0.03
c -0.06a -0.05a -0.07a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Banking crisis in originit 0.03
b 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.005
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.010) (0.010)
Banking crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij -0.11a -0.06a -0.06a -0.06a
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Banking crisisit× ln time-to-shipij -0.08a -0.02b -0.03a -0.12a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 185948 185948 185948 185948 185948 185948
Country-pair fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exporter and importer fixed effects Yes Yes No No No No
Importer × year fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
Exporter × year fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by destination-year, with a, b, and c respectively
denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Year dummies are included in all estimations. Time-to-
ship is demeaned. In columns (1) and (2), estimates of time-invariant bilateral variables (contiguity, common
language, common colonizer, colony, common legal origin) are not reported.
Our baseline results are again unaffected: the interaction term between banking crisis in
the importer country and time-to-ship is still negative and significant. A banking crisis in
the exporter country has a slightly positive or insignificant impact on exports depending on
the specification, a result consistent with Abiad et al. (2011). However, the interaction term
between banking crisis in the exporter country and the time-to-ship is negative (columns 2,
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and 4 to 6). This may be interpreted in light of our model if a banking crisis in the exporter
country is an indication of funding stress for exporters. In equation (7), note that an increase
in the interest rate at which exporters borrow has the same qualitative effect as an increase
in the probability of default in the importer country. Both effects on trade are amplified by
time-to-ship. A banking crisis is a rough indicator of the difficulty and cost of borrowing for
exporters but the result is suggestive of the same type of mechanism as the probability of
default of importers on which we focus.
In Table 3, we conduct several robustness tests starting from regression (3) in Table 1.
So all regressions include country-pair fixed effects and year dummies. One might argue that
our results are driven by an increase in the elasticity of trade to time-to-ship over time.17 As
the number of banking crises increases over time (see Figure 1 in Appendix A.1), this could
bias our results. Our amplification effect of time-to-ship might also capture the fact that
crises have become both more frequent and distant over time. In regression (1) in Table 3, we
include a full set set of interactions between year dummies and our crisis variable (to control
for their increased frequency) and between year dummies and time-to-ship (to control for
its potential increased impact over time). As shown in column (1), the interaction between
crises and time-to-ship remains significant at the 1% level.
In regression (2), we replace the measure of time-to-ship that we expanded from Feyrer
(2011) by his original measure, which implies the loss of many observations. In regression
(3), we use simple distance as an alternative measure for time-to-ship. The effect is similar
in both cases. Distance and our measure of time-to-ship are very correlated but as explained
before differ for certain pairs of countries, in particular contiguous ones. Remember that our
theoretical framework generates a radically different role for trade costs, such as distance,
and for time-to-ship. Both distance and time-to-ship, because they increase trade costs,
reduce trade flows but only time-to-ship raises the elasticity of trade to financial risk. In
order to check whether distance per se or time-to-ship is at the source of our main results,
we include both interaction terms in regression (4). As predicted by theory, the distance
interaction looses its significance but the time-to-ship interaction remains similar in size and
17Time-to-ship is highly correlated with distance, and the impact of distance on trade has been shown to
increase over time (Disdier and Head, 2008).
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Table 3: Crises, time-to-ship and imports: robustness
Dependent Variable ln Bilateral exports
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln GDP originit 0.89
a 0.87a 0.88a 0.89a 0.89a 0.89a 0.89a 0.95a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP destinationjt 0.80
a 0.80a 0.81a 0.80a 0.90a 0.80a 0.80a 0.84a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
FTAijt 0.37
a 0.37a 0.45a 0.44a 0.37a 0.44a 0.44a 0.36a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Common currencyijt 0.29
a 0.22a 0.30a 0.28a 0.25a 0.28a 0.28a 0.15a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln Real exchange rateijt 0.02
a 0.02a 0.02a 0.02a 0.02a 0.02a 0.02a 0.03a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Banking crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij -0.06a -0.07a -0.05a -0.06a -0.04a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Banking crisis in destinationjt -0.06
a -0.08a -0.07a -0.07a -0.07a -0.06a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Banking crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij (Feyrer) -0.08a
(0.01)
Banking crisisjt × ln distanceij -0.07a -0.0001
(0.01) (0.0199)
ln time-to-shipij × ln GDP destinationjt -0.03a
(0.00)
Currency crisis in destinationjt -0.04
b -0.03c
(0.02) (0.02)
Currency crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij -0.04a -0.04a
(0.01) (0.01)
Banking crisisjt × financial dev. distanceijt -0.002a
(0.0001)
Observations 307462 222873 317456 307462 307462 307241 307241 254921
R2 0.857 0.855 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.856 0.875
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by destination-year, with a, b, and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% levels. Bilateral fixed effects and year dummies are included in all estimations. Time-to-ship and distance are demeaned. Column (1)
includes a full set of unreported interactions between year dummies and banking crises, and between year dummies and time-to-ship. Column
(2) uses the original Feyrer’s time-to-ship but reduces the sample coverage. In column (8), “Financial dev.” means financial development and
the time coverage is 1960-2009.
very significant. This suggests that time-to-ship and not distance is at the source of our
amplification result. In regression (5), we include an interaction term between time-to-ship
and the GDP of the destination country. The objective is to check whether the time-to-ship
amplification effect comes from a demand effect of the financial crisis that lowers income.
We see first that in periods with low GDP importer countries import relatively more from
countries with higher time-to-ship. More importantly, the interaction term between time-
to-ship and the banking crisis is not much affected. In regression (6), we use an alternative
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measure of financial risk in the destination country and replace the banking crisis dummy
by a currency crisis dummy (also coming from Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011). We see that the
interaction term with time-to-ship exhibits a similar effect. In regression (7), we interact
both the banking crisis dummy and the currency crisis with time-to-ship. Estimates are
both significant and quantitatively similar. This suggests that other financial risks, such as
currency crises which may also put into danger international payments, have similar effects
to banking crisis. Finally, in the last regression, we check whether our time-to-ship measure
does not capture the effect of a distance between the financial development of the trade
partners that could amplify the impact of the financial crisis on their trade. The time-to-
ship interaction term remains very significant in this case.
Table 10 in Appendix A.2 reports further robustness checks. Time-to-ship may be corre-
lated with importer or exporter characteristics that affect their responses to financial crises.
We therefore interact the banking crisis dummy with the economic size (GDP) or the finan-
cial development level of the importer or the exporter. We find that a crisis in the importing
country has a larger negative effect when the exporter is economically smaller (column 1), or
when the importer is economically larger (column 2) and more financially developed (column
4). Moreover, when the exporter is a developing country, a crisis in the importing country
has a more negative effect on trade (column 5). This is consistent with Berman and Martin
(2012) who find that exports of Sub-Saharan African countries are hit harder than the av-
erage when a crisis occurs in their partner countries. In regression (6), we add interaction
terms between regions for the origin country and the banking crisis dummy in destination
to check whether our results are due to a specific region in the world. We see this is not
the case. In that table, it is worth noting that, across specifications, the estimate of the
interaction between crisis and time-to-ship remains highly significant and remarkably stable.
In Figure 2 in appendix, we test whether the effect of banking crises on imports and
the magnification effect of time-to-ship builds up through time, i.e. if these effects are
amplified as the crisis lasts. We start from our baseline specification (Table 1, column (4))
but replace the crisis variable by a set of dummies representing the number of years since
the crisis started. More precisely, we split our crisis variable into four dummies which equal
1 respectively if the importer country is (i) in the first year of the crisis; (ii) in the second to
20
fourth year; (iii) in the fifth to the ninth year; (iv) if the crisis started more 10 years before or
more. We further interact these bins with the (demeaned) time-to-ship variable. Figure 2.a
plots the deviation of bilateral imports during a crisis depending on its duration. The x-axis
represents the “natural” trade level as given by the gravity equation, and the figure can
therefore be interpreted as the deviation from this level. The 90% confidence intervals are
depicted by dotted lines around the estimated effect. Figure 2.b represents the magnification
effect of time-to-ship. Both the average effect of the crisis and the effect of time-to-ship are
found to increase (in absolute value) as the crisis lasts. This can be understood as follows: a
crisis destroys imports, which deviate from their natural level; as long as the crisis continues,
more trade is destroyed and trade moves further away from its natural level.
Finally, in Appendix A.3, we present further evidence of the amplification effect of time-
to-ship on sectoral trade. The negative effect of time-to-ship is observed in various sectors,
suggesting that our results are not due to composition effects.
4 Firm-level evidence
Data. We use the firm-destination specific export data from the French customs over the
period 1995-2005. This database reports the volume (in tons) and value (in euros) of exports
for each product (combined nomenclature) and destination, for each firm located on the
French metropolitan territory. Unit values are computed as the ratio of export value divided
by export volume. These are therefore imperfect measures of export prices. Some shipments
are excluded from this data collection. Inside the European Union (EU), firms are required
to report their shipments by product and destination country only if their annual trade value
exceeds the threshold of 150,000 euros. For exports outside the EU all flows are recorded,
unless their value is smaller than 1000 euros or one ton. Those thresholds only eliminate a
very small proportion of total exports. As unit values and export volumes can be noisy we
clean the data by dropping the observations for which the yearly growth rate of one of these
variables was in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution, computed by year.
We match this data set with Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)’s banking crises data in des-
tination countries between 1995 and 2005. Moreover, as we want to estimate variants of
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the specification (10) for French firms exports, we add destination specific variables, such
as GDP, real exchange rate, FTA and common currency (euro) (see section 3.2 for details
on the construction of these variables). For time-to-ship, we use the same methodology
and source as in the previous section. In this section, we only use time-to-ship between
France and the countries it exports to. In a previous version of the paper we also had com-
puted a time-to-ship measure from a different source: we computed the amount of time (in
days) required to ship from France’s main sea port (Le Havre) to each to the destination
countries’ main sea ports. The data come from Sea Rates, a sea-freight broker based in Mi-
ami, Florida (http://www.searates.com). Sea Rates provides the estimated shipping time
which depends on the actual itinerary of the ship which takes into account the crossing of
international canals such as Panama, Suez, but also the Saint Lawrence seaway or the Kiel
canal linking the North sea to the Baltic sea. Our results are very similar to those obtained
with Feyrer data so we do not report them here. They are available upon request.
Results. We assess the impact of financial crises in the destination countries on the inten-
sive and extensive margins on trade at the firm-level. We also estimate whether this impact
is magnified by shipping time. Table 4 depicts the results on the intensive margin. Columns
(1) to (3) report the estimations on unit values, columns (4) to (6) on export volumes, and
columns (7) to (9) on export values. Note that similar results are obtained when the log
of destination GDP is included in the unit value regressions (columns 1 to 3), which is not
required theoretically. All columns show within estimations since they include fixed effects
at the firm-destination level. Year dummies are also added.
Consistent with our theory, French firms are found to react to a financial crisis in the
destination country by increasing their prices (column 1), and decreasing their export vol-
umes and values (columns 4 and 6). This suggests therefore that there is pricing-to-market
which responds to the financial condition of the destination country, in this specific case, the
increased risk that comes with a financial crisis. All these effects are significant at the 1%
level. Unit values increase by around 3% on average (column 1), and export volumes decrease
by 12% (column 4). This leads to a 9% decrease in export values (column 7). Time-to-ship
affects the way in which quantities and values react to crises, in a way consistent with the
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Table 4: Crises, time-to-ship and exports: firm-level results (prices, volumes and values)
Dependent variable ln Unit Valueijt ln Trade Volumeijt ln Trade Valueijt
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Banking crisisjt 0.03
a 0.04a 0.04a -0.12a -0.00 -0.00 -0.09a 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
ln Real Exchange Ratejt 0.11
a 0.11a 0.11a 0.49a 0.50a 0.50a 0.58a 0.58a 0.59a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Common currencyjt -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.07
b 0.07b 0.07b 0.05c 0.05c 0.05c
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
FTAjt -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
c 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Banking crisisjt × Shipping timej -0.01 0.02 -0.10b -0.14b -0.08b -0.12c
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.06)
Banking crisisjt × ln distancej -0.03c 0.06 0.04
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
ln GDPjt 0.94
a 0.96a 0.96a 0.83a 0.84a 0.84a
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Observations 2721451 2721451 2721451 2721451 2721451 2721451 2721451 2721451 2721451
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by destination-year, with a, b, and c respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% levels. Year and firm-destination dummies are included in all estimations.
model and our aggregate results: the drop of exports is larger for destinations with higher
time-to-ship (columns 5 and 8). On unit values, however, the coefficient on the interaction
term between crises and time-to-ship is not statistically significant (columns 2 and 3).
Interestingly, when we include both distance and time-to-ship in our estimations (except
in column 3), only the interaction with time-to-ship remains significant (despite the very
high correlation between the two variables) - at the 5% level in column (6) and at the 10%
level in column (9).
The impact of longer time-to-ship on the effect of financial crises is also significant quan-
titatively. To give an idea of the magnitude of the effect, in column (5) an increase in
time-to-ship from 10 to 20 days magnifies the drop of export volumes during a financial
crisis from -1% to -8% (-12% for 30 days of time-to-ship). For export values, the effect is
insignificant for 10 days but drops to -6% for 20 days, and up to -10% after 30 days (col. 8).
Table 5 contains the results on the extensive margin. We estimate the probability that a
given firm exits from a given destination, and how it depends on the occurrence of banking
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crises and other destination-specific variables. We either use fixed effect logit estimations
(columns 1 to 3) or linear estimations with firm-destination fixed effects (columns 4 to 6).
Note that as these are within estimations, any firm-destination that contains only zeros or
ones is not considered. Again, in all estimations year dummies are included. The dependent
variable is the probability that a firm i does not export to a destination j during year t,
conditional on exporting in t− 1.
Table 5: Crises and exports: firm-level results, extensive margin
Dependent variable Pr(Exitijt > 0)
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimator FE Logit LPM
Banking crisisjt 0.219
a 0.026 0.027 0.038a -0.003 -0.002
(0.012) (0.025) (0.025) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006)
ln GDPjt -1.841
a -1.859a -1.866a -0.293a -0.298a -0.299a
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln Real Exchange Ratejt -0.769
a -0.773a -0.778a -0.172a -0.173a -0.173a
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Banking crisisjt × Shipping timej 0.191a 0.273a 0.040a 0.042a
(0.021) (0.037) (0.005) (0.009)
Banking crisisjt × ln distancej -0.098a -0.003
(0.036) (0.008)
Observations 1717848 1717848 1717848 1717848 1717848 1717848
Notes: Standard errors (robust for LPM estimations) in parentheses with a, b, and c respectively denoting
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Pr(Exitijt > 0) is the probability that a firm i does not export
to market j during year t, conditional on positive exports in year t− 1. Year dummies and firm-destination
fixed effects are included in all estimations.
Unsurprisingly, a crisis increases the probability to exit a given destination in the year
of the financial crisis. The average effect is however quantitatively low: in column (4), the
exit probability increases by less than 4 percentage points during crises episodes. This is
consistent with Bricongne et al. (2012) who find that during the 2008-2009 financial crisis,
most of the fall in exports by French firms was due to the intensive margin. Note however
that this effect comes on top of the income drop that itself increases the exit probability. As
predicted by theory, the effect of the financial crisis on the exit probability is amplified by
higher time-to-ship (columns 2, 3 and 5 and 6).
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5 Conclusion
This paper has documented a robust stylized fact, and discussed a possible mechanism
underlying it. When a country is hit by a financial crisis, its imports decrease more when
the time-to-ship to the partner country is higher. It was the case during the recent trade
collapse, but also in past crises. At the aggregate level, this result is robust to the inclusion
of various controls or to the use of alternative estimators. It is also observed at the sectoral
level and at the firm-level on a large panel of French firms over the period 1995-2005. The
effect of crises in destination countries is magnified at both the intensive (export volumes
and values) and the extensive margin (exit probability) levels.
What is the reason behind this magnification effect of time-to-ship? We argue that
the time-to-ship amplification may be considered as a footprint left by a financial friction
specific to international trade. The risk associated with longer shipping time is heightened
during financial crisis, as the probability that an importer defaults on his payment obligation
increases as time passes. Our model has implications at the firm level on exporter prices,
quantities and entry-exit adjustment during financial crises which are broadly consistent with
the data. Importantly, time-to-ship in our framework is not only a trade cost, it increases
the elasticity of trade to financial risk.
The mechanism that we analyze may have larger implications for how financial frictions
and risk both at the aggregate and at the individual level affect trade patterns in particular
at the business cycle frequency.18 In particular, interest rate changes, exchange rate volatility
may affect international trade through this mechanism and be amplified by time-to-ship. We
leave these theoretical and empirical questions for future research.
18As shown theoretically by Martin and Rey (2006), an increase in trade frictions during financial crises
may increase the likelihood of a financial crisis. This points to a mechanism where financial crises and trade
frictions are jointly and endogenously determined
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A Appendix
A.1 Descriptive statistics
Figure 1: Share of observations with banking crises, by year
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Table 6: List of countries
Afghanistan Gabon Oman
Albania Gambia Pakistan
Algeria† Georgia Palau
Angola† Germany† Panama†
Antigua and Barbuda Ghana† Papua New Guinea
Argentina† Greece† Paraguay†
Armenia Grenada Peru†
Australia† Guatemala† Philippines†
Austria† Guinea Poland†
Azerbaijan Guinea-Bissau Portugal†
Bahamas Guyana Qatar
Bahrain Haiti Romania†
Bangladesh Honduras† Russian Federation†
Barbados Hong Kong Rwanda
Belarus Hungary† Saint Kitts and Nevis
Belgium† Iceland† Saint Lucia
Belize India† Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Benin Indonesia† Samoa
Bermuda Iran Sao Tome and Principe
Bhutan Iraq Saudi Arabia
Bolivia† Ireland† Senegal
Bosnia and Herzegovina Israel Seychelles
Botswana Italy† Sierra Leone
Brazil† Jamaica Singapore†
Brunei Darussalam Japan† Slovak Republic
Bulgaria Jordan Slovenia
Burkina Faso Kazakhstan Solomon Islands
Burundi Kenya† Somalia
Cambodia Kiribati South Africa†
Cameroon Korea (Republic of)† Spain†
Canada† Kuwait Sri Lanka†
Cape Verde Kyrgyzstan Sudan
Central African Republic† Laos Suriname
Chad Latvia Swaziland
Chile† Lebanon Sweden†
China† Lesotho Switzerland†
Colombia† Liberia Syria
Comoros Libya Taiwan†
Congo Lithuania Tajikistan
Costa Rica† Macau Tanzania
Cote D’Ivoire† Macedonia Thailand†
Croatia Madagascar Togo
Cuba Malawi Tonga
Cyprus Malaysia† Trinidad and Tobago
Czech Republic Maldives Tunisia†
Czechoslovakia Mali Turkey†
Dem. Rep. of the Congo Malta Turkmenistan
Denmark† Mauritania Uganda
Djibouti Mauritius† Ukraine
Dominica Mexico† United Arab Emirates
Dominican Republic† Moldova United Kingdom†
Ecuador† Mongolia United States†
Egypt† Morocco† Uruguay†
El Salvador† Mozambique Uzbekistan
Equatorial Guinea Namibia Vanuatu
Eritrea Nepal Venezuela†
Estonia Netherlands† Viet Nam
Ethiopia New Zealand† Yemen
Fiji Nicaragua† Yugoslavia
Finland† Niger Zambia†
Former Soviet Union Nigeria† Zimbabwe†
France† Norway†
Note: † indicates countries covered in the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)’s historical data set on financial crises.
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Table 7: Banking crises, starting dates
Country Crises (start) Country Crises (start)
Algeria 1990 Korea (Republic of) 1983,1986,1997
Angola 1992 Malaysia 1985,1997
Argentina 1980,1989,1995,2001 Mauritius† -
Australia 1989 Mexico 1981,1994
Austria 2008 Morocco 1983
Belgium 2008 Netherlands 2008
Bolivia 1987,1994 New Zealand 1987
Brazil 1963,1985,1990,1994 Nicaragua 1987,2000
Canada 1983 Nigeria 1992,1997
Central African Republic 1976,1988 Norway 1987,1991
Chile 1976,1980 Panama 1988
China 1997 Paraguay 1995,2002
Colombia 1982,1998 Peru 1983,1987,1999
Costa Rica 1987,1994 Philippines 1981,1997
Cote d’Ivoire 1988 Poland 1991
Denmark 1987,2008 Portugal 2008
Dominican Republic 1996,2003 Romania 1990
Ecuador 1981,1994,1996,1998 Russian Federation 1995,1998,2008
Egypt 1981,1990 Singapore 1982
El Salvador 1989,1998 South Africa 1977,1989
Finland 1991 Spain 1977,2008
Germany 1977,2008 Sri Lanka 1989
Ghana 1982,1997 Sweden 1991
Greece 1991,2008 Switzerland 2008
Guatemala 1991,2001,2006 Taiwan 1983,1995,1997
Honduras 1999,2001 Thailand 1979,1983,1996
Hungary 1991,2008 Tunisia 1991
Iceland 1985,1993,2007 Turkey 1982,1991,1994,2000
India 1993 United Kingdom 1974,1984,1991,1995
Indonesia 1992,1997 United States 1984,2007
Ireland 2007 Uruguay 1981,2002
Italy 1990 Venezuela 1978,1993
Japan 1992 Zambia 1995
Kenya 1985,1992 Zimbabwe 1995
France 1994,2008
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). Note: † Mauritius faced various currency crisis with the
following starting dates: 1979, 1981, 1983, 1997.
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Table 8: Time-to-ship between France and the 68 destination countries
Country Number of days Country Number of days
Algeria 7.2 Korea (Republic of) 45.1
Angola 20.3 Malaysia 33.8
Argentina 26.2 Mauritius 29.3
Australia 48.4 Mexico 21.0
Austria 12.1 Morocco 5.4
Belgium 0.2 Netherlands 1.0
Bolivia 31.1 New Zealand 47.0
Brazil 21.7 Nicaragua 22.7
Canada 13.6 Nigeria 17.2
Central African Republic 19.1 Norway 2.9
Chile 30.9 Panama 19.8
China 43.5 Paraguay 26.8
Colombia 18.4 Peru 25.5
Costa Rica 21.7 Philippines 39.8
Cote D’Ivoire 15.2 Poland 4.4
Denmark 3.2 Portugal 4.0
Dominican Republic 16.3 Romania 13.5
Ecuador 23.0 Russian Federation 6.3
Egypt 12.8 Singapore 34.5
El Salvador 23.3 South Africa 25.3
Finland 5.7 Spain 0.7
Germany 0.3 Sri Lanka 28.1
Ghana 16.2 Sweden 2.8
Greece 11.3 Switzerland 0.3
Guatemala 23.5 Taiwan 40.3
Honduras 23.0 Thailand 37.8
Hungary 12.2 Tunisia 8.6
Iceland 5.6 Turkey 12.1
India 26.3 United Kingdom 0.5
Indonesia 35.6 United States 13.6
Ireland 2.1 Uruguay 25.8
Italy 0.8 Venezuela 17.4
Japan 46.5 Zambia 31.1
Kenya 26.2 Zimbabwe 30.9
Average (number of days): 19.4
Note: The primary source for time-to-ship data is Feyrer (2011). Details about our extension are
given in the text.
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Table 9: Mean by categories of the banking crises dummy
Banking Crisisjt ln Exportsijt ln Distanceij Contiguity Com. Language
0 15.75 8.63 0.03 0.16
1 16.00 8.69 0.03 0.14
Total 15.78 8.64 0.03 0.16
Banking Crisisjt Com. Colonizer Colony Com. Legal Origin FTA Com. Currency
0 0.04 0.03 0.36 0.06 0.01
1 0.04 0.03 0.36 0.07 0.01
Total 0.04 0.03 0.36 0.06 0.01
Note: Com. means Common.
A.2 Aggregate robustness
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Table 10: Crises, time-to-ship and imports: Additional robustness
Dependent Variable ln Bilateral exports
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln GDP originit 0.88
a 0.88a 0.95a 0.86a 0.88a 0.88a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP destinationjt 0.80
a 0.81a 0.81a 0.87a 0.80a 0.80a
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
FTAijt 0.44
a 0.44a 0.36a 0.41a 0.44a 0.44a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Common currencyijt 0.28
a 0.28a 0.15a 0.26a 0.28a 0.28a
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
ln Real exchange rateijt 0.02
a 0.02a 0.02a 0.03a 0.02a 0.02a
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Banking crisis in destinationjt -0.33
a 0.22b -0.07a 0.05c -0.005
(0.07) (0.10) (0.02) (0.03) (0.021)
Banking crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij -0.07a -0.06a -0.05a -0.05a -0.07a -0.08a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Banking crisisjt × ln GDP originit 0.02a
(0.01)
Banking crisisjt × ln GDP destinationjt -0.03a
(0.01)
Financial development originit 0.10
a
(0.01)
Banking crisisjt × Financial development originit -0.01
(0.02)
Financial development destinationjt -0.11
a
(0.03)
Banking crisisjt × Financial development destinationjt -0.13a
(0.03)
Banking crisisjt × Developing countryit -0.09a
(0.02)
Banking crisisjt × North Americai 0.05b
(0.03)
Banking crisisjt × South Americai -0.09a
(0.03)
Banking crisisjt × Europei -0.01
(0.02)
Banking crisisjt × Central East Europei -0.12a
(0.03)
Banking crisisjt × NAfrica MEasti -0.18a
(0.04)
Banking crisisjt × SSAfricai -0.19a
(0.04)
Banking crisisjt × SE Asiai -0.002
(0.037)
Banking crisisjt × E Asiai 0.09a
(0.03)
Observations 307462 307462 264102 282053 307462 307462
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by destination-year, with a, b, and c respectively denoting significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Bilateral fixed effects and year dummies are included in all estimations. Time-to-ship is
demeaned. Columns (3) and (4): due to data availability on financial development, the sample period is 1960-2009.
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Figure 2: Time-to-ship and the duration of financial crises
(a) Effect of banking crises on imports (b) Effect of time-to-ship×banking crises on imports
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A.3 Sectoral evidence
This appendix presents further evidence of the banking crises and the amplification effect
of time-to-ship on sectoral trade. To run our analysis, we use a constructed data set of 26
International Standard Industrial Classification (Revision 2) 3-digit industries, 181 exporting
countries and 69 importing countries. The list of sectors and ISIC codes are tabulated in
Table 11. The country coverage is the same as in the aggregate-level analysis. Table 6 lists
countries in our sample and indicates countries covered in the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011)’s
data set. Again, the lower number of importing countries is due to the availability of the
banking crises data. However, the time period coverage is shorter from 1980 to 2009 instead
of 1950-2009.19
Table 11 presents the results of the estimates of the interaction term between the banking
crisis dummy and time-to-ship, sector by sector, for the period 1980-2009. The specification
is the same as the one used in column (2) of Table 1 with country and time fixed effects, as
well as controls for the bilateral and unilateral factors affecting trade. Overall estimates are
19See de Sousa, Mayer and Zignago (2011) for more details on the construction of the sectoral data set
from 1980 to 2006. We expanded this data set until 2009 to cover the most recent financial crisis.
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available upon request.
The estimates of the interaction term between the banking crisis dummy and time-to-ship
are sorted according to their magnitude. More than half of the estimates are significant and
in line with the aggregate point estimates of Table 1. The largest amplification effects are
found in the divisions 31 (manufacture of food, beverages and tobacco) and 38 (manufacture
of fabricated metal products, machinery and equipment). In contrast, no amplification effect
is found in the division 32 (textile, wearing apparel and leather industries).
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Table 11: Crises, time-to-ship and exports: sectoral evidence
Industry ISIC Estimate of Clustered Observations
code Banking crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij standard errors
Beverages 313 -0.093a 0.025 88838
Mach elec 383 -0.091a 0.026 143642
Prof/Sci 385 -0.087a 0.023 121974
Machines 382 -0.087a 0.024 151935
Food 311 -0.085a 0.020 143115
Oth Chem. 352 -0.084a 0.025 125391
Tobacco 314 -0.083a 0.028 41561
Transport 384 -0.074a 0.022 126479
Ind. Chem. 351 -0.072a 0.021 130492
Printing 342 -0.062a 0.022 111875
Glass 362 -0.057a 0.021 92892
Rubber 355 -0.055b 0.023 100947
Nf metals 372 -0.052b 0.021 100550
Non-metal 369 -0.042c 0.022 91468
Paper 341 -0.040c 0.024 100526
Metal prod 381 -0.036c 0.022 134867
Plastic 356 -0.033 0.026 109972
Wood 331 -0.027 0.018 104221
Textiles 321 -0.017 0.023 142457
Pottery 361 -0.012 0.021 82052
Iron/steel 371 -0.011 0.023 99436
Petroleum 353 0.006 0.024 72338
Apparel 322 0.019 0.024 125436
Footwear 324 0.021 0.025 79901
Leather 323 0.025 0.022 100221
Furniture 332 0.026 0.023 92536
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by destination-year, with a, b, and c re-
spectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Each row reports the sectoral
estimate of the interaction Banking crisisjt × ln time-to-shipij . The specification is the same as
the one used in column (2) of Table 1, including ln GDPit, ln GDPjt, FTAijt, Common currencyijt,
ln Real Exchange Rateijt, ln Time-to-shipij , Banking crisis in destinationjt, Contiguityij , Com-
mon languageij , Common colonizerij , Colonyij , Common legal originij , as well as importer, ex-
porter and year dummies. Time-to-ship is demeaned. The sample period is 1980-2009. See
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcst.asp?Cl=8&Lg=1 for a description of the ISIC
Revision 2 industries.
37
